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Abstract
The first section of the paper reviews the kind of action which unfolds in
Plato's Republic, and argues that, from Book II onwards, its character shifts
from a genuine dialogue (communicative action) to a more manipulative
kind of intercourse (strategic action). While the former kind of action was
characteristic of the educational activities of the historical Socrates, the case
is made that this kind of action became largely eclipsed in Western educa-
tion and superseded by the strategic concerns to which Platonist conceptions
of learning gave prominence. The Platonist legacy, it is pointed out, had a
decisive impact on Western conceptions of learning, even beyond the
Enlightenment. These conceptions were largely custodial rather than eman-
cipatory in character. An argument is presented in thirteen steps in the
second section of the paper, to establish the case that the kind of action
which properly describes the experience of teaching and learning is that of
a cultural courtship. A distinction is drawn between honourable and dishon-
ourable forms of courtship, the honourable being a candidate for defence
in universalist terms. The practical import of the distinction is considered.
Under the title 'The Dialogue that we Aren't', the third section reviews
postmodern objections - particularly those of Lyotard - to the kind of argu-
ment made in the thirteen steps, and the concluding section considers
Habermas' later theories in relation to my own 'universalist' argument.
Key terms: communicative action; courtship; 'the dialogue that we are'
(Gadamer); postmodernism; Plato's custodianship; virtues of teaching and
learning
Communicative and Strategic Action
There is an intriguing tale in Plato's Republic which is often referred to
as the 'noble lie', or alternatively as the 'magnificent myth'. In this tale,
the rulers of the polis - but those alone - are envisaged by Plato as having
the authority to use systematic falsehoods in dealing with the citizens, if
it is for the greater good of the polis.2 Drawing on this authority, the rulers
are to furnish the public's consciousness with the following account of the
origins of human society:
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COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
You are, all of you, in this polis, brothers. But when god fashioned
you, he added gold in the composition of those of you who are qual-
ified to be rulers, (which is why the ruler's prestige is greatest); he
put silver in the auxiliaries, and iron and bronze in the farmers and
other workers. Now since you are all of the same stock, though your
children will commonly resemble their parents, occasionally a silver
child will be born of golden parents, or a golden child of silver
parents, and so on.3
Plato charges the rulers with keeping a watchful eye on 'the mixture of
metals' in the characters of the children, as the privileges of education
and the powers of leadership are to be reserved for the most promising:
the silver and especially the gold. A bronze child bom to a family of high
rank must be demoted to the ranks of industrial and farm workers, and
similarly, a golden child born to a family of low rank must be promoted
to receive the lengthy education which will equip him or her to be a ruler.
The noble lie makes imperative the abolition of the family and domestic
household and their replacement by mating festivals and state nurseries.
The rulers are to see to it that during such festivals gold mates with gold
as often as possible and bronze with bronze as seldom as possible. An
ingenious lottery is to be contrived for this purpose so that those who are
disappointed in their mate can 'blame the lot and not the Rulers'.4
Now if we were to put this tale in Habermas' terms, Plato's noble lie
looks like a comprehensive warrant for regarding the conduct of public
life as an exercise in 'strategic action', as distinct from 'communicative
action'. A state-controlled education system is to play the key part in
enforcing this warrant, and it seems that the entire educational enterprise
is accordingly to to be conceived as an arena for strategic rather than
communicative action. Exploring the difference between both kinds of
action, Habermas describes it as a question of 'the pretheoretical knowl-
edge of competent speakers, who can themselves distinguish situations in
which they are causally exerting an influence upon others, from those in
which they are coming to an understanding with them'.5 Indeed any study
of the history of Western educational institutions - from the period of
Classical antiquity to the emergence of the 'postmodern' themes of recent
decades - will supply only rare instances of an educational ethos charac-
terized by efforts of teachers and learners to come to shared convictions
in an unforced way. This is probably as true of the history of higher
learning as it is of the history of primary and secondary schooling.
Now, curiously, the situation in which the noble lie is first suggested is
itself one of communicative rather than of strategic action. More precisely,
it is ostensibly so. In the middle books of the Republic we witness three
partners in an exploratory dialogue, seeking to come to a shared convic-
tion in an uncoerced, unconstrained way about the nature of justice and
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the means for its promotion in the polis. Plato places Socrates and two
youthful partners, Glaucon and Adeimantus, in a situation where any idea
or suggestion, no matter how far-fetched, can be ventured in the dialogue
and its merits given serious and lengthy consideration. Apart from the
outburst of Thrasymachus in Book I (who is clearly portrayed as a petu-
lant contrast to the dialogue's main characters), the ethos of the dialogue
unfolds for the reader as one of urbane reasonableness, and this tends to
mask or to mitigate the coercive character of many of its main conclu-
sions. But it is important to recognize that this reciprocal reasonableness
among the partners is not an emergent characteristic of an actual speech
situation: rather it is a literary atmosphere contrived by Plato to present
his monological arguments in the most attractive light. In particular, the
use of the dialogue form canvasses the impression that the conclusions
reached express a common will - a will which has been enlightened by
the communicative events of the dialogue. And on a more intractable
issue, the casting of Socrates as the chief protagonist in the dialogue tends
to locate the dialogue itself inseparably among the distinctive activities of
the historical Socrates - activities which Plato had already done much to
record for posterity and which were aimed at seeking knowledge collab-
oratively, as distinct from transmitting truths didactically.6
If we look more closely then at the kinds of action which characterized
the philosophical efforts of Plato on the one hand and Socrates on the
other, the educational significance of the distinction I am attempting to
explore reveals itself more clearly. Let us begin with Plato, and introduce
Socrates along the way. Apart from the general points already made, there
are two particular recommendations in the Republic which are strikingly
at odds with what we know of the communicative practice of Socrates.
The first of these concerns how teaching, as a human activity, is to be
conceived. And here, the famous similes of the sun, the divided line and
the cave are directly relevant, since they serve as dramatic devices to intro-
duce Plato's metaphysical theory of truth, for which education will become
the chief instrument:
Then what gives the object of knowledge their truth and the knower's
mind the power of knowing is the form (idea) of the good. It is the
cause of knowledge and truth and you will be right in thinking of it
as being itself known, and yet as being something other than, and
even more splendid than, knowledge and truth, splendid though they
What the lengthy and rigorous enterprise of teaching and learning must
achieve, in Plato's scheme, is the turning around of the 'eye of the soul'
from its saturation in a morass of culturally induced ignorance, to ascend
to a vision of the eternal and changeless good, and to become purified
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COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
and transformed by this ascent. Plato, as we know, clearly lays out a
curriculum through which the ascent is to be pursued by those chosen for
it by the rulers. But on the kind of action required for the pursuit itself,
Plato is uncharacteristically terse. He makes his Socrates say: 'Then this
turning around of the mind might itself be made the subject of a technë,
which would effect the conversion as easily and effectively as possible'.8
The rationalist tenor of this remark contrasts strongly with one of the
more characteristic and memorable claims of Socrates, reported for
instance in the Protagoras. In that dialogue, after listening to the sweeping
declarations of Protagoras to be able to teach virtue, Socrates opens a
sustained debate with the reply 'I did not think that this was something
that could be taught'.9
The second of the recommendations which utters oddly from the mouth
of the Socrates of the later books of the Republic, concerns the require-
ments necessary for the commencement of work on the construction of a
polis characterized by justice. Describing the rulers of the envisaged polis
as 'philosophic artists', Plato makes his Socrates assert:
The first thing our artists must do - and it's not easy - is to wipe
the slate of human society and of human habits clean. For our philo-
sophic artists differ at once from all others in being unwilling to start
work on an individual or a city, or draw out laws, until they are
given, or have made themselves, a clean canvas.10
If this recommendation were to be taken as a literal prescription for action,
then the kind of action necessary would be inescapably authoritarian, and
relentlessly so. Even then, it is unlikely that its success (or effectiveness)
would be anything more than partial. The historical evidence of conquests,
persecutions and attempted 'exterminations' shows this clearly enough.
Whether these recommendations - and the other controversial provisions
of the Republic - were intended as a warrant for an authoritarian and
closed society (as, e.g., Popper claims), or whether the entire book must
itself be read as one grand Utopian dialectical myth (as, e.g., Gadamer
maintains), there is still little in Plato's Republic, or indeed in his later
provisions for education in his Laws, which calls our attention in a primary
way to forms of practical action other than law-making, custodianship,
censorship, self-denial, the acknowledgement and contemplation of eternal
truths, the discharge of duties of office and obedience to authority.
The contrived character of the ethos of reasonableness in the Republic
becomes more evident when we recognize a shift in the style of author-
ship at a crucial stage. From the point in the text where the question of
education is first introduced (Book II, 376c), the contributions of Glaucon
and Adeimantus lose the exploratory and critical character they had up
to then. Control of the action from here onwards becomes increasingly
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concentrated in the hands of Plato's Socrates, and Glaucon and
Adeimantus are called on to do little more than keep up the appearance
of dialogue by successive acknowledgements of the compelling force of
the arguments of the senior partner. These developments are punctuated
by strategically placed questions of Plato's making, which enable that
senior partner to elucidate his author's metaphysics at considerable length.
The fact that Plato does not henceforth allow a form of action where such
elucidation would be seriously contested at any controversial or ques-
tionable points by either of the two junior partners, reveals that the these
very points are not open, as they would be in a genuinely Socratic dialogue.
Plato himself is accordingly revealed as someone who is a committed
custodian of a truth of an absolute and changeless character, which if not
quite certainty, is virtually so.11 The superior character of changeless truth
therefore takes precedence for Plato over any truths which might be
disclosed by the interplay of viewpoints in a Socratic enquiry: truths, that
is, of an emergent, provisional, self-critical character. The kind of ethical
commitment revealed by this latter kind of enquiry is one which gives to
a jointly undertaken pursuit of truth, a place of special importance among
human activities. It suggests that we uncover something of our best selves
in the disciplined conduct of self-critical dialogue. There is more than a
hint here of an ontological claim - a claim that Gadamer was explicitly
to express in the words 'the dialogue that we are'12 - a claim moreover
which remains present but implicit, behind the procedural character of
Habermas' theory of communicative action. By contrast, a conception of
education which gives priority to the transmission of changeless truths
closes off any scope for taking up such a suggestion, or for entertaining
the ontological claim and its practical consequences.
The history of education in the European and Western world - until
the Enlightenment and long afterwards - provides a replete testimony to
the recurrent victory of Platonist conceptions of truth over the Socratic
championship of joint enquiry. This history bears witness to the casting
of teaching and learning as a conformity with the precepts of authority.
It bears witness also to the eclipse of a form of educational action where
the identity of individuals and groups would be allowed a judicious lati-
tude and scope in the interplay with the voices of tradition. The enterprise
of learning, in other words, becomes more a colonized institution than a
pursuit enjoying a qualified degree of sovereignty. Of course this history
is well documented and widely known, but while the denial of sovereignty
may in the past be associated with the strategic interests of an authori-
tarian church or state, in modern Western democracies the colonizing
impulse is usually more implicit, but often scarcely less real. It has now
largely passed to other hands, but to see this more clearly, together with
its import, we need first to examine at closer range what actually befalls
us when teaching and learning take place.
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COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
The Lifeworlds of Learning
The argument in this section is set out in thirteen numbered paragraphs,
each one advancing the argument a further step. In unfolding the argu-
ment, I am keen to proceed from an account of what actually befalls us,
over and above our wanting and doing, to an account of what might most
appropriately happen to us, or what what kind of educational action we
might most defensibly engage in, when we consciously bring our wanting
and doing into play. As I move from the first to the second of these phases
I will be attempting to put Habermas' formulation of the principle of
universalization to work in practice: attempting, that is, to explore the
nature of what it commits us to, and to make an appraisal of this. So
before embarking on my thirteen steps, let me quote Habermas' formu-
lation of this principle:
(Thus) every valid norm has to fulfill the following condition: (U)
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects [which]
its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction
of everyone's interests (and these consequences are preferred to those
of known alternative possibilities for regulation).13
For the sake of completeness it is worth adding Habermas's shorter maxim:
'valid norms must deserve recognition by all concerned'14
The Argument
1 In the formal language of schooling we are thoroughly familiar with
locutions such as 'the transmission of skills and attitudes', 'the passing
on of cultural heritage', 'the imparting of knowledge'. Yet such familiar
utterances, despite their currency, are far from doing justice to actual
practice. When placed under scrutiny they can properly be seen as
little more than clichés, (i.e. 'truisms' which tell only half oí the story).
Moreover, by beclouding the more significant part of the story, such
truisms can induce a habitual failure of discernment among those who
accommodate them uncritically in their educational outlooks.
2 Teaching is never a one-way activity of 'transmission', 'imparting', or
'passing on', no matter how purged such activity seeks to be of perlocu-
tionary intent, or more particularly, of harbouring proprietorial designs
on the sensibilities of the young. Teaching, rather, always brings about
learning of some kind, even if the learner learns little more than to
dislike the teacher or perhaps learns to become more adroit in resisting
what the teacher tries to teach. So teaching and learning constitute -
at a minimum - a joint activity: an experience shared, from different
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cultural standpoints, by teacher and students. More precisely, this
experience can be described as an unfolding interplay: between the
ever-emergent abilities and sensibilities of students on the one hand,
and, on the other, the voice which addresses these abilities and sensi-
bilities through the presentations and enactments of the teacher. But
what identifies the legitimate intent of such presentations? And what
does voice mean here?
3 Clearly, what addresses the students through the presentations of the
teacher makes an appeal of some kind to their attentions, their efforts,
and indeed their commitments. How can such appeals be justified? Is
it by calling attention to a test or examination which draws ever nearer
from the distance? Such justifications as this may of course have prac-
tical effects on sizeable numbers of students, but they will have little
on others and will be resented by many who may already see them-
selves among the ranks of the 'also-rans' or even 'non-runners'. In
any case, the doubtful merits of this kind of justification side-step the
central issue, and give pride of place to something other than the
authenticity of the voice which seeks to be addressed to the students.
4 The authenticity of that voice, and of its appeal, whether it be the
voice of history, Irish, science, maths, religion, art, or whatever, might
perhaps best be illustrated by describing the activity of teaching and
learning not just as an ever-emergent interplay, but as an interplay
which is at the same time a special kind of communicative action:
namely, courtship, or wooing. At first sight this may seem bold to the
point of audacity, and of course it requires clarification. So, to begin
with, it must be emphasized that courtship here is meant as no mere
metaphor. It seeks rather to describe the kind of cultural interplay
which the experience of teaching and learning actually is - including,
as we shall see, those turbulent cases where the teacher's approaches
are rebuffed or even ridiculed by the students. To describe the expe-
rience of teaching and learning as a courtship moreover, is to highlight
just those vital dimensions of teaching which Plato obscured, and also
to make available to us what are, perhaps, the most secure grounds
for withstanding the charge of indoctrination.
5 In the interplay of cultural influence - no less than in the conduct of
affairs of the heart - we can identify different kinds of courtship. We
can recognize the kind of courtship which declares its intentions with
honesty, which pursues them accordingly, which recoils from the
forcing of a suit, which has the courage to face difficulties as they
arise, which prizes both frankness and the dignity of privacy, which
seeks to evade the ruts of mere habit, and which draws its special
character from the delights and disappointments, the frustrations and
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COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
surprises of mutual discovery, or shared disclosure. In short, we recog-
nize something of a categorical sense of care here in one person's basic
attitude to the other. We are well aware however that there is another,
perhaps more common, kind of courtship, where considerations of a
more questionable kind are to the fore: where the arts of dissembling
and seduction are harboured and nurtured, where perlocutionary
devices are ingeniously honed and deployed, where the characteris-
tics of the first kind of courtship are at best secondary to the securing
of the prize, or perhaps more accurately, the imagined prize. Of course
courtship can frequently alternate between the different kinds, but I
am keen to identify those features of courtship which would render
it more a form of communicative than of strategic action.
6 In the kind of cultural courtship which - I am arguing - embodies
the heart of education as a legitimate form of intercourse, the authentic
voice of the subject (e.g. history) speaks only in so far as the teacher's
enactment succeeds in casting that voice in an engaging, yet faithful
idiom: an idiom which addresses the sensibilities of the students in an
inviting, challenging, self-critical and sincere manner. In other words,
the idiom is adapted and the manner is enacted to call forth a ques-
tioning, but open-minded response from the particular students being
addressed. It is important to recall here what was said above about
teaching and learning being an interplay rather than a transmission,
so some kind of response is going to be forthcoming anyway, even if
its true character cannot be discerned on the surface.
7 Now, if I teach history, or Irish, or science, or religion, or any other
subject which has gained a place on the school curriculum, it is a
defensible course of action (or normatively right) that I should
encourage my students to see that / believe that the subject I'm teaching
has something rich and enduring to offer. It is similarly defensible
moreover that I should wish my students to share something of my
own enthusiasm for the subject: that my occupational commitment as
a teacher should express itself - taking the four examples mentioned
- in encouraging them individually and collectively to discover some-
thing of the historian in themselves, or something of linguistic aptitude
and appreciation in themselves, or something of the scientist in
themselves, or something of their own religious sensibilities. None of
this is to deny that it may take inspired pains, a discerning and
tough faith, and sterling reserves of equity and forebearance on the
teacher's part to unearth that 'something'. Nor is it to deny that
the 'something' may initially look quite puny even when it is
unearthed. Such unearthing invariably marks an advance in shared
understanding however: an event of emancipation of the student (and
the teacher) from a previously inhibiting state. It enables the student
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to understand something more of her own particular promise, her
own aptitudes and limitations; to take a genuine step in the gradual
appropriation of her own identity.
The picture is quite different however, and gives legitimate grounds
for disquiet, if, as a history teacher, I seek to inculcate in the students
a personal allegiance of my own to an officially sanctioned, or other-
wise tendentious version of the past; if as a science teacher, I seek to
silence any side of the argument on safe sources of energy; if, as a
teacher of Irish, I insinuate the view that this language confers the
badge of cultural or racial superiority; if, as a teacher of religion, I
treat matters of faith as if they were matters of fact; if, in any instance
of teaching, my approach presumes some proprietorial claim on the
sensibilities of the students. Unless the disavowal of such a claim
becomes an imperative of professional discipline in teaching, the inter-
play of influence between teachers and pupils may become rapidly,
even irrevocably, disfigured. The lifeworlds of learning may thus
become inured to institutionalized forms of colonization: often ones
which may be happily blind to their own partisan character.
The point to emphasize from these explorations is that there are
virtues of teaching which are candidates for universal validity, as
distinct from being sectional or factional virtues. These virtues disclose
themselves as procedural requirements in any serious effort to give
practical effect to the principal of universalization in the contexts of
teaching and learning. But this also means - contra Habermas - that
the principle of universalization is more than a formal, procedural
principle, and that efforts to give effect to it reveal inescapable connec-
tions with substantive ethical orientations. Recalling the argument of
the last four paragraphs then, such virtues can now be seen to include:
(a) a circumspect honesty in declaring one's own intentions as a
teacher;
(b) patience and persistence, which are judicious rather than impor-
tunate;
(c) the courage and moral energy to tackle obstacles and chal-
lenges;
(d) frankness, coupled with respect for each student's privacy and
dignity;
(e) an originality which resists the ruts of habit and returns anew
to the address of the subjects which are the teacher's abiding
point of contact with the students;
(f) a judicious faith in students, even in unpromising or inhos-
pitable circumstances;
(g) a disavowal of proprietorial designs, coupled with a construc-
tive sense of self-criticism;
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COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
(h) a categorical sense of care for students, including an unfailing
commitment to equity and to high expectations.
This last requirement, a categorical sense of care, is evident in one
way or another in all variants of what Habermas calls 'cognitivist
ethics', including his own 'discourse ethics'. Consider for instance
Habermas' formulation: 'The moral principle is so conceived as to
exclude as invalid any norm that could not meet with the qualified
assent of all who are or might be affected by it'.15 In our efforts to
give effect to this principle in practice however, what is excluded serves
to place in sharper focus what must be included: for instance, not just
procedures, but procedural requirements which have the character of
substantive virtues, such as the list just outlined. These virtues of
teaching are human practices moreover, rather than merely attitudes,
or commendable sentiments. They are still not the same however as
the skills (technai) of teaching (e.g. classroom management skills),
though they can dramatically transform how the skills of teaching are
exercised. The virtues of teaching are concerned, first and foremost,
with the releasement and enablement of students. This does not mean
any kind of releasement or enablement, but rather the venture of
uncovering the nature and scope of the student's ownmost promise. The
specific, yet universal, character of these virtues of teaching make
them worthy candidates for the occupational commitments of teachers
as professionals. Such virtues are thus to be distinguished from
teachers' personal convictions in matters of ethics, politics, religion,
etc., although they may well be in harmony with, or draw sustenance
from, the latter.
10 The virtues of teaching just mentioned nurture a commitment to the
end-in-view of the kind of communicative action we are currently
exploring. That end-in-view can now be described as the actual
bringing about in some sustained measure (not just the facilitation)
of a genuine engagement between the emergent potentials of the
students and the authentic voices of the differing subjects which seek
to address these potentials. It is important to emphasize that it is not
the bringing about of conformity; nor is it acquiescence in a code of
dogmatic canons, whether in science, religion, politics, literature,
history, or any other subject. The success intended here is in crucial
respects procedural, though it also orients the emergent moral climate
in certain directions rather than others. I'll return to this question of
ethos in a moment, and again at the end, but at this point we also
need to note that the exercise of the virtues of teaching may require
a teacher to intervene decisively at times and exercise authority in a
firm manner. Such intervention makes the interplay between teacher
and learner even more asymmetrical than usual, but this should not
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be confused with the use of power for arbitrary purposes (though it
could degenerate into that). Rather its justification would be that of
earnestly attempting to restore an orientation towards a shared under-
standing, whether of the nature of a difficulty in mathematics, of the
nature of a conflict in history, or of the nature of a contentious moral
issue.
11 In all practical instances where rules of procedure are being applied,
a distinctive ethos arises unavoidably from such application. Where
rules have been decided on high and enforced with strict punitive
measures, the ethos is likely to be one of compliance, coupled perhaps
with an undercurrent of resistance, of minor or maybe major propor-
tions. By contrast, where the rules and their application are a practical
working out of the kinds of virtues we have been considering, a distinc-
tive ethos arises quite naturally, as distinct from something imposed.
Or to use Habermas' phrase, 'communicative action provides the
medium for the reproduction of lifeworlds'.16 (I take this to mean the
reconstitution or reconstruction of the lifeworlds of learning of indi-
vidual pupils, with a view to bringing about qualitative changes, rather
than the reproduction of any status quo.) In this latter kind of ethos,
the growing commitment of pupils and teacher to such rules helps to
build personal identity around an unforced spirit of community. Such
an ethos greatly helps the teacher moreover to present her subject
(or subjects) in a manner best adapted to her students. She is accord-
ingly enabled to provide a robust defence of her subjects, and to have
her own understanding of them challenged to further efforts by the
students' questions and comments. This is the fruitful interplay of a
cultural courtship in action.
12 Teaching and learning have been described here not as different exper-
iences, but as an experience shared, from different perspectives, by
teachers and students. Accordingly, the virtues of teaching, outlined
first in paragraph 9 above, can be seen to be paralleled by virtues of
learning, which the kind of ethos just described seeks to sustain among
the students. Chief among such virtues of learning, which can now be
listed, are the following:
(a) a commitment to effort in the pursuit of fluency;
(b) tolerance and cooperation among students, in relation to each
other's attempts;
(c) method and growing discernment in their efforts to understand;
(d) acknowledgement of the claims of balance in the exercise of
critical judgement;
(e) acknowledgement of the claims of equity in all aspects of
teaching and learning;
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COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
(f) receptive openness by students to what is decently addressed
to them;
(g) readiness to ask questions or raise critical queries;
(h) willingness to take responsibility for their own learning.
13 When taken together, the virtues of teaching and learning not only
describe how educational practice might look in a state of relative
sovereignty, they also provide defensible criteria for teachers to make
an appraisal of their own occupational commitments and of their own
professional practice. This is not to suggest that they are a catalogue
of qualities for sainthood. It is important to stress that, as criteria,
they emerge from practice, they seek to be universal in character, and
therefore seek to serve as the basis for a universally defensible ethic
for teachers. Of course the freedom to elaborate and to practice such
an ethic is often curtailed by a host of institutional constraints, or
precluded by legal instruments, or indeed undermined by inhospitable
philosophical outlooks which gain more than a tentative footing in
influential quarters. It is to this cluster of inhospitality that I want to
turn in the next section of the paper.
The Dialogue that we Aren't
Towards the close of his book The Postmodern Condition, Jean François
Lyotard suggests that the evolution of social interaction is taking the
following course in those collectivities which he variously describes as
'post-industrial societies', 'computerized societies', or 'postmodern cultures':
The temporary contract is in practice supplanting permanent insti-
tutions in the professional, emotional, sexual, cultural, family and
international domains, as well as in political affairs.17
Lyotard describes the world of 'post-industrial' society as one where
the necessity to justify actions by reference to some universally defensible
criteria has been largely superseded by the pragmatic demand to perform
effectively in the various spheres of action (or 'language games' as he
calls them) which make up social intercourse. The scope of his analysis
covers social, political and cultural life in the widest sense, but he focuses
in particular on two main categories of 'language games'. On the one
hand, he gives a key importance to scientific knowledge and its efficient
production, and on the other, he identifies 'narrative knowledge', which
includes standards of acceptability and performance for such domains
as the ethical, the evaluative-aesthetic and the socio-political more
generally.18 It is important to distinguish between what Lyotard calls
ordinary narratives and what he calls 'grand narratives', or 'meta-
narratives'. Ordinary narrative he describes as the kind of knowledge that
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'does not give priority to the question of its own legitimation' and that
'certifies itself in the pragmatics of its own transmission without having
recourse to argumentation and proof'.19 Of particular importance for
Lyotard in this connection are the assumptions - moral, political, and
aesthetic - which are characteristic of particular cultures and which are
largely taken for granted in the 'language games that combine to form
the social bond'20 in those cultures. On the part played by narratives in
such language games he remarks:
Narratives . . . determine criteria of competence and/or illustrate how
they are to be applied. They thus define what has the right to be
said and done in the culture in question, and since they are them-
selves a part of that culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact
that they do what they do.21
Lyotard believes that the quest for anything more than this kind of
immediate legitimation - a quest which is a distinguishing mark of crit-
ical philosophy from Socrates to the present - is a superfluous and even
an ominous one. Accordingly, he claims that his second category of narra-
tive - what he calls the 'grand narratives' or 'metanarratives' of Western
philosophy - has lost its credibility in a postmodern culture. Such 'meta-
narratives' would include all philosophical efforts which seek to identify
universal rather than immediate criteria for any field of human endeavour,
or which presuppose anything like a worthy end for humankind as a whole.
Examples of prominent 'metanarratives' which Lyotard cites are 'the
dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the
rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth'.22 In this single cita-
tion, Lyotard waves a dismissive hand over a very wide range of religious,
philosophical and political conceptions of humankind, and of its prospects
for freedom - conceptions which have been central to Western philos-
ophy. Without naming anybody, the philosophical endeavours of Hegel,
Kant, Marx, Heidegger, and Adam Smith, not to mention the classical
Greek philosophers, are curtly discarded. Rather more pointedly, the same
judgement extends to prominent living philosophers whose works are far
from having lost credibility: Habermas, Gadamer and Ricoeur. In an essay
included as an appendix to the English version of The Postmodern
Condition, Lyotard identifies the work of Habermas as the chief target of
his polemic.23 In a bold and memorable phrase in the Introduction to the
book, Lyotard declares: 'I define postmodern as incredulity towards all
metanarratives'.24 He offers no justification (or 'legitimation') for this
standpoint of incredulity, but simply asserts that it is both the product of
progress in the sciences and is in turn presupposed by such progress.25
The summary nature of Lyotard's arguments and the unrestrained sweep
of his conclusions make his analysis questionable on virtually all impor-
tant points. Here, however, I shall concentrate on examining his comments
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on 'legitimation', with a view to making explicit what I believe to be an
underlying incoherence in Lyotard's postmodernist standpoint. 'Narration',
Lyotard argues, 'is the quintesessential form of customary knowledge', and
he describes a number of features of such knowledge in order to show
how ordinary narratives create and maintain the social bond in the partic-
ular cultures which embody them. These features include: the moral-heroic
contents of popular stories, the rituals and routines of storytelling, the
variety of culturally accepted patterns of behaviour which stem from a
particular culture's narratives; the apprenticeships which must be served
before a member of a culture can be accepted as a 'sender' as distinct
from an 'addressee' of a narrative.26 But Lyotard now jumps to two strange
conclusions from this analysis of the functions served by ordinary narra-
tives. The first of these conclusions - which he acknowledges goes 'against
all expectations', is that 'a collectivity that takes narrative as a key form
of competence has no need to remember its past'.27 The second conclu-
sion, which is related to the first, is his declaration that the ordinary
narratives of particular cultures are legitimated simply by their degree of
effectiveness in the culture in question, or in his own words: 'legitimated
by the simple fact that they do what they do'.28 A few pages later, Lyotard's
distaste for any further forms of legitimation than those provided by uncrit-
ical criteria of effectiveness ('performativity') makes him add to these
conclusions the declaration that the search for such further legitimation
is a special form of Western cultural imperialism.29
Lyotard's conclusions on the forgetting of the past, and on the self-
sufficient legitimation provided by ordinary narratives, might conceivably
have application in a culture which remained closed to all external and
critical influences. But this is a condition which is scarcely attainable in
any culture which falls under his own description as a 'computerized', or
'postmodern' society. The very pluralism of such societies means that
narratives which have been traditionally accepted in their cultural
heritages are being continually contested, not least by the proliferation of
critical and revisionist forms of scholarship and by literary journalistic
critiques of culture which have become an everyday occurrence. The perva-
sive and frequently acrimonious character of such pluralism moreover
gives point and urgency to disciplined efforts to identify legitimate forms
of communicative action which would combine tolerance with diversity -
the universal with the particular: for instance efforts such as those of
Habermas, Thomas McCarthy and Richard J. Bernstein.30 Or we might
also refer to efforts such as those of Gadamer and Ricoeur to identify
new forms of solidarity, including the contribution which critical-
hermeneutic reflections on experienced traditions might make to this
quest.31 I am keen to argue that contemporary philosophical efforts such
as these bear witness in different degrees, and in somewhat different ways,
to that vulnerable, committed, but communicatively open way of being
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human which Gadamer called the 'dialogure that we are'. I would like to
add moreover that such witness has a crucial significance for education,
including policy-makers and teachers. By contrast, any rejection of the
aspiration towards universality closes the door on such dialogue and almost
inescapably asserts a contrary orientation for human intercourse, most
frequently one towards power, or coercion, or cultural superiority -
whether in traditional authoritarian dress or in the playful attire of post-
modernism. It must be admitted however that this latter orientation, viz.
the 'dialogue that we aren't', may be more alert than the 'dialogue that
we are', to new moves in the dance of fashion in matters political, ethical
and educational.
Yet the legitimizing of the practices of a particular culture - by uncrit-
ically drawing on the culture's own key narratives, or by furnishing denials
of solidarity in attractive presentations - is clearly a precarious under-
taking in modern (including 'postmodern') societies. Although less than
impartial conceptions of the quest for truth frequently enjoyed a lasting
place in the sun in the history of Western civilization, they also fell to
memorable ridicule on occasion, or came to grief in the most dramatic
way: for instance the example of Socrates' encounters with the Greek
sophists, politicians and jurors, or Christ's encounters with the Jewish High
Priests, or Luther's break with Roman tradition, or the Enlightenment
and its extended critical legacy. Against Lyotard's postmodern incredulity
it must be pointed out that historical instances such as these, together
with an abundance of present-day examples, bear recurring witness to
something which cannot be simply dismissed as a 'metanarrative' of philos-
ophy: namely, to an experienced practical imperative among politically
alert peoples in all continents. This imperative is for more critical and
more universal forms of legitimation than those of local tradition, or those
of a tradition which has become a self-sufficient 'language game', uncrit-
ical of its own presuppositions and orientations. It is an emergent or
incipient aspiration towards the 'dialogue that we are'.
The ontological presuppositions of Lyotard's argument now call for
particular attention. They betoken a conception of human being where
one is the effectiveness of one's present performance, or more precisely,
where the status of one's being as a human is the effectiveness of one's
moves in a competitive (agonistic) language game. What Lyotard describes
as the 'tendency towards the temporary contract' in the various spheres
of human intercourse, is a tendency which contrasts sharply with tradi-
tional conceptions of identity, commitment, responsibility, and defensible
action - whether of conservative, radical or other ancestry. The enduring
character of such traditional conceptions is discarded in favour of concep-
tions which highlight the tentative and episodic. One's life becomes, as it
were, not so much an unwritten novel or autobiographical drama, with
what Maclntyre describes as an unfolding narrative continuity from birth
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to death; rather it becomes more an unwritten anthology of short stories
- transitory episodes which differ from the chapters of an autobiography
in that the self who is the author of any one story is a temporary self.
This would be a self with possibly radically different outlooks, aspirations
and actions from the temporary selves who 'are' the author of any or all
of the preceding and succeeding stories.
The picture here is not entirely unfamiliar. At the level of educational
practice, we have become increasingly familiar in recent years with features
such as the following (and here I confine myself to four developments):
(a) short-term contracts which continue to gain ground in replacing
permanent appointments for teachers and lecturers;
(b) 'performance indicators' which virtually equate educational quality
with effectiveness of output, whether of published articles or
certificated students;
(c) modularization of curricula, which enables the various disciplines
of learning to be more easily packaged as commodities for
consumer choice and for effective 'delivery' in a time span of a
semester or less.
(d) A conception of the university which seeks to relegate and even
to displace the disinterested pursuit of learning, and its attendant
requirement of a qualified academic sovereignty, in favour of the
university as a strategic intellectual and technological resource: a
resource, that is, for the more effective servicing of the demands
of society, conceived as as a social, as well as an economic market.
The image of the market captures not only the shifting nature of supply
and demand, a feature which has been traditional in markets throughout
history. More significantly, it captures an emergent social reality of our
times with startling force. It is well known that the markets of technologi-
cally advanced countries, if they are to meet their own targets for effec-
tiveness, must rely on the widescale stimulation of desires, cultivation of
appetites, and manipulation of tastes. This is accomplished through such
devices as aggressive advertising, recurrent trend-setting, and through
incessant efforts to destabilize and colonize the ever-emergent and
frequently vulnerable sense of personal identity. Now if we extend these
manipulative devices from the markets of commerce and economics into
the ethical, cultural, and artistic aspects of communication, that is
into human intercourse itself conceived as a social market, we begin to
see more clearly the features of what I have called 'the dialogue that we
aren't', and how this coalesces with the Nietzschean provenance of most of
what Lyotard describes in The Postmodern Condition.
Lyotard's description of the postmodern condition is not of course an
isolated philosophical tract on our times. It has echoes in Richard Rorty's
insistence on the 'incommensurability' of different discourses and in
267
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
9:0
2 0
9 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
Derrida's embrace of différance.32 Rorty's description of himself as a 'post-
modern, bourgeois liberal' is intended to remind his readers that his overt
partiality towards the traditional liberal ideals of bourgeois culture is not
paralleled by any commitment to the traditional philosophical underpin-
nings of these ideals. Indeed his hostility towards epistemology and towards
any kind of search for philosophical 'foundations' has strong parallels
with Lyotard's 'incredulity towards all metanarratives'. Rorty's conception
of 'edifying philosophy' as a kind of continually renewed 'redescribing' or
'remaking' of ourselves33 also calls to mind the episodic, or transitory char-
acter of 'language games' in Lyotard's postmodernism. This connection
is further strengthened when we recognize that Rorty's 'redescribing' is
made possible only by his decisive break with any necessity to ground
philosophy in presuppositions which might be candidates for universal
defensibility. Moreover he views such continual 'redescribing' as 'the most
important thing we can do', and attempts to appropriate Gadamer's edu-
cational concept of Bildung to this most anti-hermeneutic of projects.34
Finally, Rorty's evident celebration of such 'remaking' and 'redescribing'
is reminiscent of Lyotard's emphasis on the avant garde: or more precisely
on 'the increase of being and the jubilation which result from the inven-
tion of new rules of the game, be it pictorial, artistic or any other'.35
Certain influential features of Derrida's 'deconstruction' also add to this
picture of 'the dialogue that we aren't'. Consider for instance the prac-
tical import of his championship of différance, with its attendant
ambiguities and ambivalences - particularly where an educational engage-
ment with a cultural and intellectual heritage must be got under way in
some sustained manner, and for entire school-going populations. Consider
further the import of his attachment to the play of undecidability over
any enduring practical commitment. Consider finally his apparently endless
deferral of any definitive emergence of moral identity and also the continu-
ing unreadiness which follows from this to accept any but the most minimal
responsibility in practice for one's self, one's beliefs and attitudes, and
one's conduct. In referring here to influential features of Derrida's 'decon-
struction' however, I don't wish to focus just on the clamour of the
deconstruction industry in literary and philosophical criticism. In partic-
ular I don't wish to overlook the possibility that there may be in the
ambivalent and ambiguous play of différance, something which might
enable a genuine dis-mantling or dis-robing of the most urbanely attired
prejudices: something which might allow what has been thought and said
in the historical conversations of humankind to be experienced with moral
inklings which reach beyond the assurances sought by most traditions
of moral enquiry.36 What kind of communicative or educational action
might follow from this possibility is however a problematic issue. So in
short, on one reading, Derrida's work can be seen as a key feature of the
inhospitable cluster I have been exploring. On another reading, his work
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points in the opposite direction to that of postmodernists like Lyotard and
Rorty - a direction which occasionally recalls the thought-provoking
Socratic combination of commitment and uncertainty.
Conclusions: the Autonomy of Moral Theory?
I would like to make some concluding remarks now on how I think
Habermas' work stands in relation to the picture I have been sketching
of 'the dialogue that we aren't'. In the closing section of his essay 'Morality
and Ethical Life',37 Habermas draws the attention of his readers to the
limitations of the discourse ethics which he has championed. One of
the questions he raises here is 'whether it is reasonable to hope that the
insights of a universalist morality are susceptible to translation into prac-
tice'.38 Acknowledging that what he has to say on this question may come
as a disappointment, he sees it as incumbent on moral enquiry to explain
and ground the moral point of view in some universalist ethic. And he
sees this as an essentially theoretical task.
But isn't it inescapably the case that the insights of a universalist
morality arise in the first instance from practice itself, or from the life-
worlds of those who hold these insights? In this connection, I believe there
is a keen hermeneutic insight in Maclntyre's arguments on the secular-
ization of morality by the Enlightenment - particularly his claim that
judgements issuing from the ostensibly autonomous sphere of morality
(and he has Kant in mind in particular) are in fact 'linguistic survivals
from the practices of classical theism which have lost the context provided
by these practices'.39 That is to say, the effective history of classical theism
lives on in a secularized form in the dispositions and the arguments of
the modern Kantian moralist. Or, more precisely, the morality proposed
by the Kantian moralist wants to preserve and refine some essentials of
the substantive orientation of a traditional theistic morality, but to replace
its particularist character and its teleological programme with a universal
formula. This kind of insight seems to be supported by Habermas' own
arguments on 'lifeworld' knowledge, or 'pre-reflexive', 'background'
knowledge in The Theory of Communicative Action, where he describes
it as having the three following remarkable features:
It is an implicit knowledge that cannot be represented in a finite
number of propositions; it is a holistically structured knowledge, the
basic elements of which intrinsically define one another; and it is a
knowledge that does not stand at our disposition, inasmuch as we
cannot make it conscious and place it in doubt as we please.40
What this amounts to is that the demarcation between concrete ethical
life on the one hand - which is invariably pervaded by the quality of our
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upbringing and everyday experience - and, on the other hand, the claims
of rational critique and moral theory, is a demarcation which distorts our
understanding of human understanding itself. The exploration of teaching
and learning in action, carried out in part two of this paper, bears this
out. So to conclude, as Habermas does in the following passage, seems to
me to be to take a wrong turn:
What moral theory can and should be trusted to do, is to clarify the
universal core of our moral intuitions and thereby to refute value
scepticism. What it cannot do is make any kind of substantive contri-
bution.41
This passage, with its heavy emphasis on a circumscribed rational domain
for theory, seems to assert that there can be such a thing as unprejudiced
moral theory as such: an autonomous court of purely procedural enlight-
enment, unaffected by or unfavoured by the moral and practical
presuppositions of everyday experience, or if you like, lifeworld experi-
ence. By contrast, I would maintain that in so far as there can be such a
court of reason, it is necessarily a court of rationality in action, so its proce-
dures always owe something to the background perspectives and
orientations of its participants, and its autonomy in this sense is never
more than partial. Its inspirations and judgements moreover remain in
some inescapable sense indebted to, or encumbered by substantive
prejudgements of a moral/practical character. In summary, the procedures
of communicative action invariably embody virtues of a practical kind,
and these reveal that communicative action itself proceeds from self-
critical reflection within one or more normatively oriented traditions,
rather than from anything like a rationally autonomous moral theory. I'd
like to finish then by calling attention to a remark of Paul Ricoeur's at
the close of his essay 'Science and Ideology', where he declares:
For nothing is more necessary today than to renounce the arrogance
of critique and to carry on with patience the endless work of
distancing and renewing our historical substance.42
I don't think Ricoeur is suggesting that critique is necessarily arrogant,
but I would like to shift the emphasis of his remarks by saying that the
'dialogue that we are', and the educational practices which are its strength
and sustenance, finds its most promising possibilities in an alert hermen-
eutics which remains both critical and self-critical. By contrast, such a
dialogue is shipwrecked by the games of postmodernism and is drawn on
a wrong path by the claims of autonomous theory.
St Patrick's College, Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland
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